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A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT
.Daniel N. Hoffman*
UNDECLARED WAR: TwILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER.

By Edward Keynes. University Park, Pa. and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1982. Pp. ix, 236. $17.95.
THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS. By Ann Van "Wynen Thomas

andA.J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.
1982. Pp. xiii, 177. $15.
In Undeclared War, Professor Edward Keynes has set himself the
task of assessing, first, the intent of the Framers regarding the scope
and distribution of the constitutional war powers; second, the appropriate role of the judiciary in resolving doubts and conflicts about
those powers (with special reference to the "political question" doctrine); and third, the actual record of judicial involvement with these
questions. In general Keynes deserves high marks for the historical
accuracy and right-thinking character of his conclusions, though I
have some reservations about the clarity of the exposition and the
comprehensiveness of coverage.
Keynes is at his best in his review of the Framers' effort to subject
war-making to the rule of law. His conclusions cannot be repeated
too often in these sorry times, when the regnant doctrine often appears to be an outright monarchism in everything but name. Lest
this statement be thought extreme, recall that when President Richard Nixon wished to assure the Supreme Court that he was not
claiming monarchical powers, he could concede only that the President does not serve for life. 1 During his tenure, presumably, the
President's sovereign prerogative has no limit and his will is law.
Nixon's successors have not been discernibly more restrained in their
bold constitutional claims; nor, as Keynes would agree, has the
Supreme Court really laid these claims to rest.
• Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of South Florida. A.B. University of Chicago; J.D. Harvard; Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor
Hoffman is the author of GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981) and the coauthor (with Morton Halperin) of FREEDOM
VS. NATIONAL SECURITY: SECRECY AND SURVEILLANCE (1977) and TOP SECRET: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977). - Ed.
l. Brief for the Respondent at n.43, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted
in US v. NIXON 352 (L. Friedman ed. 1974).
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Every schoolchild ought to know that the Framers were antimonarchist if they were anything. In Keynes's words:
In contrast to the modem view of the President as a king-general who

exercises prerogative or discretionary power to make foreign policy,
initiate war, and conclude peace treaties, the Framers had a limited
conception of executive authority. Since the Constitution's authors believed that governmental power would threaten liberty, they separated
and shared various powers of war, defense, and foreign affairs between
Congress and the President. [P. 2].
In a constitutional system that incorporates the principle of popular
sovereignty, such concepts as federative and prerogative powers are invitations to revolution by a weary people whose blood and treasure
have been spent in the foreign wars and military adventures that such
theories encourage. [P. 12].

It should therefore scarcely be necessary to belie, as Keynes does,
"the argument that inherent, prerogative, or sovereign power devolved from the British Crown to the President of the United States
in an unbroken chain of events between 1776 and 1789" (p. 25). Yet
it is necessary; for, remarkably, that argument has commended itself
not only to presidents, but to the Supreme Court.2
As my own research has shown,3 the record of the founding period lends no support to such a heretical doctrine. What the record
does show is a fairly persistent presidential impatience with power
sharing, and a notably inconsistent congressional response reflecting
the disruptive impact of international crises and partisan calculations upon the development of consistent, principled norms of interbranch relations. Though the Framers had clearly expected that
Congress would set the fundamentals of policy and the President
would carry it out, from early on Congress had major difficulties in
agreeing on any policy, much less on a policy with which the President might feel comfortable. His built-in advantages of structural
unity, control of information, and administrative command provided
repeated temptations to initiate decisive action, not merely propose
it. When challenged, early presidents sometimes advanced constitutional justifications for their actions that bore scarcely any resemblance to the orthodoxy of 1787-1789. They did so with increasing
boldness as their legislative counterparts failed to develop and enforce a consistent rebuttal.
Part of the problem was the sketchiness of the constitutional
plan. While Keynes argues persuasively that absolutist doctrines are
neither necessary nor proper for filling in the gaps, there is and was
much room for rhetorical maneuvering that can give such doctrines
a certain veneer of legitimacy. But more basically, the tension be2. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
3. See D. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981).
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tween the war power and the rule of law runs so deep that any effort
to subject the former to the latter is apt, in difficult times, to seem
inconvenient or even suicidal.
Keynes's effort to rationalize and justify the Framers' design focuses on the distinction between offensive and defensive military operations. In his view:
Only Congress can change the nation's condition from one of peace to
war, but the President, as civilian commander in chief, can repel sudden attacks on U.S. territory, the nation's armed forces, and its public
ships at sea. The President can also employ the armed forces to protect
citizens' lives and property. [P. 34].
Insofar as the Framers intended to vest any war powers in the President, these powers were defensive. [P. 36].

I find this argument seriously flawed. For one thing, the historical
documentation is curiously indirect.4 Despite the fact that the offensive/defensive distinction was apparently well known to international law neither the Constitution nor the surrounding debates
explicitly relied upon it. As I view the record, the Framers clearly
wished to subject the war powers to the rule oflaw, but wanted to do
so in a manner consistent not only with realistic, effective government, but also with the expansive destiny of what many called their
"infant empire." In establishing a stronger executive, then, their
central concern was not the special moral and legal status of defensive operations, but the need for "vigor, secrecy, and dispatch" in
foreign and military affairs generally. Executive power was preferred in light of both the proclivity of legislatures for drawn-out
deliberations and the crucial fact that Congress was in those days
very likely to be in recess when a crisis aro~e. 5 Thus it was clearly
essential to empower the President to repel sudden attack, but one
can argue, and presidents did, that similar considerations empowered him to do more, certainly when Congress was in recess, and
conceivably even when it was in session, so long as the steps taken
did not amount to "declaring war" - that is, to an open-ended commitment of lives and property for a major military operation against
a European power.6
In this connection, there has been too little discussion of the constitutional provision that if an emergency arises during congressional
4. Keynes relies on the facts that the Constitution requires the President to take an oath to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" which "implies an obligation to defend the
people and their government against sudden attack," p. 164, and that a "stylistic" change made
in article I - giving Congress the power to "declare" war rather than "make" war - ''was
· intended to allow the President, as co=ander in chief, to respond to sudden attacks rather
than to co=ence offensive war." Pp. 35-36.
5. Congressional sessions in the founding period typically occupied less than half the year.
6. Attacks on Indian tribes, Barbary pirates, and nonwhite "savages" did not require the
formality of declaring war.
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recess, the President "may" - not shall - convene them into special
session.7 The records of the Convention do not show what calculations, if any, supported this fateful decision of the Framers. But as
early as 1793, when war broke out in Europe, Washington used his
discretion to avoid convening Congress and to issue a presidential
Proclamation of Neutrality instead. While Representative Madison
argued that this move derogated the congressional war powers, 8
when Congress finally convened the political situation impelled not
a confrontation with the President, but a ratification of his policy. 9
The success of these preemptive tactics soon led to even bolder experiments along similar lines.
In 1794, Congress moved to enact legislation, regulating foreign
commerce, that was too anti-British for the President's taste. He
thwarted it by commencing treaty negotiations with Britain on the
same topics, and ultimately, in 1796, by signing a treaty pledging the
country not to adopt laws of the sort Congress had proposed. When
the House of Representatives protested, Washington told them
sternly that they had no right to usurp the treaty power confided
solely to him and the Senate, and that they were bound to appropriate the funds necessary to implement the treaty regardless of what
they thought of its merits. Io In truth, the Senate's checking role had
already degenerated from the original design of an executive council
that advised and consented at every stage of treaty negotiations to a
last-minute take-it-or-leave-it ratifier, that was neither fully informed as to the course of the negotiations nor allowed to inform its
constituents and take their views on the treaty's contents. Long
before the modem invention of executive agreements - a development Keynes ignores - the Senate's role had become decidedly
subordinate. I I In instance after instance - in matters not involving
sudden attacks upon the United States - an executive acting with
vigor, secrecy, and dispatch presented Congress with a fait accompfi
in foreign affairs.
It was not only congressional powers that suffered in the wake of
foreign crises, but civil liberties as well. Already by 1798, executive
arrogance had inflated to the point where public criticism of either
the administration or its policies was made a criminal act; and the
federal courts zealously enforced the Sedition Law against the opposition press. The rationale for this repressive episode did not depend
7. U.S.

CONST. art. II,§ 3.
8. J. MADISON, Heldivius No. IV, 1 LETTERS AND Or!iER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
643 (Philadelphia 1865).
9. These events are more fully recounted and analyzed in D. HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at
88-104.
IO. Id. at 131-77.
1I. Id. at 61-69, 80-82, 133-47.
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on the defensive nature of the foreign and military policies under
attack, but on the offensive nature of the Federalist party's political
strategy and its elitist views on mass participation. And its end, with
Jefferson's election to the presidency, signalled less a return to constitutional orthodoxy than a reinforcement of the view that what
counts is to have the right demigod at the helm. 12
Keynes concedes that the offense/defense principle may be an
inadequate restraint on presidential power in today's very different
world (pp. 165-67). In my view the early history shows that it never
was adequate. Even if the nature. of warfare has changed, the tendency of combatants to claim that they are acting in self-defense is
surely not new; nor is the phenomenon of a Congress reluctant to
challenge presidential initiatives for fear of being branded subversive, appeasing, or otherwise irresponsible. The vagueness of the offense/ defense doctrine only reinforces the ambivalence that inheres
in Congress as an institution. While presidents may be expected resolutely to defend the power of their office, congressional leaders
have often, in refutation of Madison's brilliant theoretical argument
in The Federalist No. 51 13 (but in emulation of his actual strategy as
a member of the House) tried to capture the presidency for themselves or their party rather than to try to weaken it. This "fusion"
(Keynes's term; some would say presidential usurpation) of the national war powers may have been legitimated by the Supreme Court
only in the 1860's, 14 but the process was already far along by 1800.
Can today's courts be expected to restore a more balanced constitutional framework? Keynes discusses the judicial role at great
length from both theoretical and historical perspectives. He argues
rather convincingly that the classical "political question" doctrine,
properly understood, does not preclude judicial arbitration of interbranch conflicts, since its rationale applies only where a power is
clearly committed to a single branch, not where it is shared by two
branches jointly (p. 69). Yet he cannot and does not claim that the---------Supreme Court has accepted this view. 15 The modem Court has
12. Id at 178-220.
13. [T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . •
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (H. Lodge ed. 1892).
14. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
15. He does suggest that support for this view may be found in Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969). P. 135. The seminal case, Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849), seems
to take a contrary line, as does Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979), a case which Keynes mysteriously omits. Keynes also misleads in implying, p. 63, that John Marshall rejected entirely the propriety of abstention from deciding political questions, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), and in suggesting, pp.
70-71, that Justice Jackson applied the political question doctrine in his dissent in Korematsu
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managed to keep all its options effectively open.
Instead Keynes proceeds with an elaborate analysis of modem
"political question" cases, all of them Vietnam-era lower court decisions. He offers a complex four-fold categorization of those cases,
and discusses at length several examples of each type (pp. 120-32).
Unfortunately, this reviewer found the categories, and the criteria
for assigning a case to a given category, very difficult to understand.
Furthermore, the dates of decision do not seem to support Keynes's
suggestion of a chronological trend toward increasing judicial activism. In fact, dicta aside, these decisions provide little evidence of
activism at all. Keynes's fourth category, the only one in which the
courts are said to have reached the merits, consists of two district
court decisions that were reversed on appeal. 16 When it comes to the
bottom line, Keynes is forced to conclude on a note of keen disappointment. The "conventional wisdom" turns out to be correct: the
courts are extremely reluctant to reach the merits in war-powers
cases; and when they do, they are nearly certain to uphold executive
action:
[J]udicial opinion continues to promote the development of a virtually
unlimited national war power. . . . . [T]he courts have acted as a midwife to the birth of constitutional dictatorship in the United
States. . . . [O]pponents of constitutional dictatorship should not
await a judicial David to slay an executive Goliath. [P. 159-60].
Before invoking the Federal judiciary's assistance, opponents of presidential warmaking should recall that the judiciary is likely either to
tolerate or to support the exercise of executive power. In the future,
opponents of presidential warmaking should focus their opposition on
Congress rather than the Federal courts. [P. 175].

This is strong language, but where the courts are concerned, it seems
entirely justified. The harsh truth is that there are precious few modem cases that in any way curtail presidential powers in foreign and
military affairs. The few that do 17 are neither sweeping in scope nor
of unquestionable validity in today's climate. On the other side may
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Consider Jackson's concluding sentence: "I would reverse the judgment and discharge the petitioner." 323 U.S. at 248.
16. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973) (challenge to the legality of military activities in Cambodia presents a nonjusticiable
political question); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), revd, 464 F.2d 178
(9th Cir. 1972) (three servicemen did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
use of military personnel in Cambodia).
17. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (government had
not met heavy burden of showing cause for prior restraint on the publication of a classified
study of Vietnam policy); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (denial of passport without due
process due to alleged Communist associations not a valid exercise of the war power); Youngs•
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (president does not, as commander-inchief, have the power to take possession of private property to prevent labor dispute from
stopping production of military goods); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (power to protect
war effort against espionage does not imply power to detain a loyal citizen).
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be counted numerous bulwarks of monarchism. 18 Most of the cases
fall outside Keynes's rather narrow definition· of his subject and are
not discussed, but their inclusion would only reinforce the conclusion he has reached.
As for his advice that opponents of presidential warmaking focus
their efforts on Congress, Keynes provides little reason for optimism
that such efforts would succeed. Indeed, his historical overview
makes clear that so far neither Congress nor the courts has provided
sufficient restraints on the expansion of presidential power. Unfortunately, he says little by way of explanation or of cure. Rather, he
seems content to present and analyze doctrinal pronouncements, abstracted from the political and social context in which they appear as if no one had any other concern but the correct expounding of
constitutional and legal texts. This is typical of academic legal studies; and it may be unfair to take an author to task for not having
written an entirely different sort of book. Still, one wishes Keynes
had gone further.
The Thomases' book, The War-Making Powers of the President,
also seeks to describe the state of the law on presidential war-making
powers, but it differs from Keynes's effort in several respects. It is
even more legalistic in approach, to the point that historical narrative is breathtakingly terse and political analysis almost absent. Yet
it goes well beyond judicial opinion in its coverage, reporting a variety of other official and academic positions on the issues. It pays
close attention to the doctrines of international law and their impact
on domestic law. It reviews in detail the arguments for and against
18. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 23, 1983) (congressional veto of
Attorney General's order suspending deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act
unconstitutional); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding authority of Secretary of State
to revoke passports on determination that citizen's activities abroad are causing serious damage to national security); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (former CIA agent held
to have breached fiduciary duty for not submitting manuscript to agency for pre-publication
review); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (unilateral abrogation of treaty by President
a nonjusticiable political question) (plurality opinion); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974) (CIA Act not unconstitutional because it permits agency to account for expenditures solely on director's certification); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (first amendment
rights not violated by Army intelligence surveillance of political activity); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding executive exclusion of ~arxist scholar under Immigration and Nationality Act); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.s: 1 (1952) (upholding Secretary of Air Force's claim of military secrets privilege in tort action); Chicago & Southern Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (president has final authority over applications to engage in overseas and foreign air travel); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding executive wartime order assigning persons of Japanese ancestry to relocation centers); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding that Congress and the
president, acting together, could impose a wartime curfew on Japanese Americans); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (Court will not review recognition of foreign governments
or agreements made by president incident to recognition); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937) (affirming president's assignment, by executive agreement, of Soviet claims against
Americans to United States); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (upholding presidential proclamation prohibiting arms sales to foreign power).
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presidential power to take a variety of specific steps, such as armed
intervention to protect American persons or property, and the interests of informal or treaty allies, against diverse threats. It includes a
useful summary of presidential acknowledgments of congressional
authority over the years, and of attempted congressional curbs on
presidential action.
Yet in the end, the Thomases seem to agree with Keynes that, for
practical purposes, presidential warmaking is scarcely subject to the
rule of law: "All in all, the power of the President to commit forces
abroad remains a dark continent of American jurisprudence" (p.
146). The very diversity, and sometimes downright craziness 19 of the
doctrinal claims they recount suggests that this is so, even though in
some cases they are prepared to take firm stands on the issues. The
courts, they agree, have largely "capitulated" to executive power (P.
109); and congressional efforts to legislate curbs have so far been
basically ineffective:
The Mayaguez incident demonstrated that neither the funding limitation nor the War Powers Resolution had diminished the ability of the
President to act decisively in committing troops abroad. [P. 143].
[T]here has been no cutting back on the assertion of the power of the
President to use force . . . [P]robably no President would refuse effectively to defend what he thought was the country's best interest . . . .
[P. 146].

The Thomases seem more hesitant to lament this result than does
Keynes. At one point they worry that the War Powers Resolution
could harm national security if it prevented presidents from threatening to use force (p. 138). Their relief that it has not done so casts
doubt upon the seriousness of their quest for constitutional balance,
and thereby diminishes much of their study's potential impact.
This brings us to a question seldom openly discussed: what, in
the best of all plausible worlds, would be the impact of such studies
as these? Of course their aim is educational, and the authors will
have helped students, government legal advisors, and litigants to
make more accurate, better documented and more subtle arguments,
but to what end? Can abuses be effectively prevented or, failing that,
redressed?
Perhaps there have been times when presidents refrained from an
action because of doubts about its legality; but this hardly seems to
be common. Presidential advisers tend to be yea-sayers, unless they
can point to decisive pragmatic reasons for holding back. Presidents
know that strong action is usually popular, and that indecisiveness or
appeasement are often devastating campaign issues. They are un19. E.g., the argument that forcible •1self-defense" may be justified by acts of "economic
aggression" such as "manipulation of tariffs." P. 59.
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derstandably more inclined to view foreign enemies as a menace to
national interests than to see their own activities in such a light.
When in doubt, security comes first. Thus such diverse personalities
as Washington, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon all
transcended legal barriers in the name of what they saw as a higher
good. Congressional leaders too have appeared to use or to waive
legal arguments, depending on the overriding political concerns of
the moment. Such action need not be consciously cynical; for, bolstered by such materials as Keynes and the Thomases provide, one
nearly always has legal arguments available that most would regard
as nonfrivolous. One may urge, and convince oneself, that a given
restraint on war-making power is unconstitutional; or that it does not
apply to the specific plan at issue; or that one is entitled to deny the
very existence of such a plan, effectively exempting it from the rule
of law. If the President goes ahead and opponents press the legal
issue, their chances for inflicting major costs in Congress, in court, or
at the polls are limited. Many Americans have more taste for "nuking Iran" than for constitutional niceties.
Still, we have not yet reached the stage where legal restraints can
be openly :fl.outed without political cost; and a nonfrivolous argument may be a losing argument. Thus, to some extent legal objections are pragmatic objections, worth making and worth backing up.
One might wish, though, for more self-consciousness than the present authors display about the uses - or lack thereof - to which
their studies lend themselves.
Whatever scholarly writings may suggest, the present prospect
for systemic legal reforms to curtail presidential warmaking seems
bleak. Am.ending the Constitution to restr~in presidential power
would attract few potent supporters. Even the disasters of Vietnam
and Watergate, like those of the Federalists' "reign of terror," produced only a short-lived intere~t in structural reform. So long as the
country's security and the leader's decency are not emphatically in
doubt, we tend to feel, why tamper with a system that works?
It may be that the level of congressional concern over existing
weaknesses in statutory curbs, such as the loopholes facilitating continued covert operations against Nicaragua and the "rescue mission"
in Grenada, or those created by the recent demise of the legislative
veto, does make some small reform proposals politically viable.
Continued executive demands for an even freer hand can and should
be resisted. In particular, it must be insisted that repeated efforts to
constrict the flow of information to the public, through such device~
as secrecy oaths, pre-publication review, visa denials, court injunctions, and criminal sanctions are not immunized from constitutional
scrutiny by the talisman of "national security," and indeed are inimi-
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cal to constitutional values.20
In the end, though, the relation between structure and function is
such that the tension between the national security state and democratic, constitutional procedures cannot be satisfactorily resolved.
Neither an army nor a secretive, elite executive body is a democratic
institution. From the founding until now, those in charge of national
defense and foreign policy have openly resisted sharing information
and power, arguing that broad participation would aid the nation's
enemies by depriving our leadership of vital unity, :flexibility, knowledge, vigor, secrecy, and dispatch. Two hundred years of ostensible
democratization have had no visible impact on this aspect of our
political life. We have repeatedly suffered major moral, material,
and political upheavals in consequence; and today we face the ultimate threat of nuclear annihilation. Whether or not our species is
incurably warlike, the suspicion grows that enduring peace in the
context of the nation-state system is a contradiction in terms. That
we escaped previous wars with our Constitution apparently intact
does not show that there is nothing amiss, nor that we can count on
our luck holding in the future. Perhaps the Framers attempted the
impossible in seeking to establish a durable republic in one country.
But at the present, real disarmament and world government are both
utopian dreams.
In these circumstances, we would do well to guard the precarious
cultural, institutional, and legal defenses against war that we do
have. Whatever their flaws, the political processes in which such
concepts as a rule oflaw, checks and balances, and the people's right
to know find their traditional uses are about the only game in town.

20. See M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET 87-102 (1977).

